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NOTES
Jurisdiction over Ex-servicemen for Crimes
Committed Abroad: The Gap in the Law
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the end of World War II, an American soldier sta-
tioned in occupied Germany heinously raped and murdered an 11-
year-old German girl. Although a suspect was identified within a
few weeks, he had been discharged and had returned to the United
States before charges could be filed in the military courts. The mili-
tary jurisdiction bad lapsed upon his discharge, and there was no
domestic court jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad by ex-
servicemen. Consequently, he went untried.1  About a year and a
half ago, the American public was informed of allegations that a
company of American infantrirmen had massacred an entire village
of South Vietnamese civilians. 2 Although criminal proceedings were
begun in military courts-martial against several of the alleged of-
fenders,8 a substantial number of others implicated had been dis'
charged before the crime was discovered. Like the soldier in the
German incident, these ex-servicemen cannot be tried for their alleged
offenses.
The German rape-murder and the My Lai atrocities, although
extreme examples, are not isolated incidents. Unlike early America,
which relied on a small professional army and a volunteer militia,
20th century America, faced with the international tensions of an ex-
panding world, has been forced to develop a world-wide force of
"peace-keeping" specialists in violence." As a result of this growth
from a small force to the present large system of professionals and
1 Myers & Kaplan, Crime Without Punishment, 35 GEo. LJ. 303, 315 (1947).
2 The incident occurred on March 16, 1968. The first news releases came on Sep-
tember 5, 1969, revealing that Lt. William Calley had been indicted for the murder of
109 civilians at My Lai. S. HERSH, MY LA 4: A REPORT ON THE MASSACRE AND ITS
AFTERMATH 128 (1970). (The author was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for this book.)
The incident did not receive much attention in the press at first. The New York Times
relegated the story of Calley's indictment to page 14. N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1969, at 14,
col 3. Public indignation was aroused on November 20, 1969, when the Cleveland Plain
Dealer ran an interview with Ron Haeberle who had photographed the massacre. See
S. HUSH, supra at 138.
3 Approximately 70 men allegedly participated in the incident, and 12 of them have
been indicted. See Comment, My Lai Massacre. The Need for an International Investi-
gation, 58 CALIF. L REv. 703, 705 (1970).
4See Comment, supra note 3, at 715-16.
5 See Girard, The Constitution and Court-Martial of Civilians Accompanying the
Armed Forces - A Preliminary Analysis, 13 STAN. L REv. 461, 462 (1961).
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conscripted amateurs, the "all-American fair-haired boy" can now be
found marching shoulder to shoulder with the hoodlum and thug.
The presence of these latter elements has presented considerable
problems in controlling and disciplining the armed forces both at
home and abroad."
The presence of an armed force in a foreign land is often ac-
companied by unauthorized acts of violence,7 and these acts may
have grave effects on the relations between the visiting and host
countries. A particular problem arises when a serviceman commits
a crime while on active duty in a foreign country and is discharged
and returned to the United States before the crime is discovered and
charges are filed.8 Under present laws, the ex-serviceman will prob-
ably go untried.
This Note will deal with the jurisdictional gap which occurs in
the above situation. There are four spheres of inquiry: (1) mili-
tary jurisdiction over ex-servicemen; (2) foreign tribunal jurisdiction
over ex-servicemen; (3) possible federal court jurisdiction over ex-
servicemen; and (4) the international law implications stemming
from the jurisdictional deficiencies presented in the My Lai situation.
The thesis presented is that there is a need for legislation conferring
federal court jurisdiction over ex-servicemen accused after their dis-
charge of committing a crime while on active duty in a foreign coun-
try.
The full spectrum of international legal issues involved in the
My Lai situation is beyond the scope of this Note. On the other
hand, the jurisdictional issues raised throughout the Note are directly
applicable to that incident. The final section of the Note takes the
position that where "war crimes" such as those which allegedly oc-
cured at My Lai are concerned, federal jurisdiction is not only neces-
sary but is obligatory under international law.
6 See Myers & Kaplan, supra note 1, at 305.
7 "It is a matter well known that the march even of an army not hostile is often ac-
companied with acts of pillage and violence.., which the most rigid discipline is hardly
able to prevent." Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 513 (1878). See also Com-
ment, O'Callahan and its Progeny: A Survey of Their Impact on the Jurisdiction of
Courts-Martial, 15 VILL L REV. 712, 721 (1970).
8 See Note, Military Jurisdiction Over Crimes Committed by Military Personnel
Outside the United States: The Effect of O'Callahan v. Parker, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1016,
1022 (1970). No problem is presented when a crime is committed by a serviceman
while on active duty in the United States because the domestic courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the military courts, and the domestic court jurisdiction does not lapse
upon the serviceman's discharge. See United States ex rel. Viscardi v. MacDonald, 265
F. 695, 697 (E.D.N.Y. 1920).
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II. MILITARY JURISDICTION OVER Ex-SERVICEMEN
A. Background of the Active-Duty Limitation
In order to understand the scope of court-martial jurisdiction, it
is necessary to distinguish the three types of law recognized and ap-
plied by those courts loosely labeled as "military tribunals."' "Mar-
tial law" is the rule of law asserted by a military force when, because
of war or national emergency, the civilian institutions have ceased to
function.10 "The law of war" is that body of international law which
sets the standards for the conduct of men and armies in time of war."'
Martial law and the law of war are enforced by extraordinary mili-
tary tribunals and are beyond the scope of this discussion. The con-
cern here is with "military law," that body of rules and regulations
governing the armed forces and their personnel in times of war or
peace.' 2 United States military law is presently codified in the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice 8 (UCMJ). Regular military courts,
properly termed "courts-martial," have jurisdiction over military per,
sonnel for any violation of the UCMJ.'4
Congress established this military jurisdiction through its article
I power to "make rules for the government of the land and naval
forces,""' and that article's "necessary and proper" clause.'"  The
necessity of a self-contained judicial system for the government of
the armed forces is clear. Because the military is often in territories
outside the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, it must carry its own
9 A military tribunal is a court made up of military personnel. It has no general
jurisdiction other than that provided by statute or executive order. See generally Gir-
ard, supra note 5, at 463-64.
10 See W. WnTHRoP, MILITARY LAW AND PREcEDENTS 817-22 (2d ed. 1896).
1 Id. at 773. See generally Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952); In re Yam-
ashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Ex parte Quinin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
12Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 141-42 (1866) (concurring opinion);
see W. WnHrroP, supra note 10, at 15, 17.
I3 UNwoRo CODE OF MILITARY JusicE, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964), as
amended, (Supp. V, 1970). There has always been a body of regulations governing
the conduct of American forces. Some of the regulations predate the Constitution. W.
WINTHROP, supra note 10, at 17. The American Articles of War of 1775, enacted
June 30, 1775, I Jour. Cong. 90, are discussed in W. WINTHROP, supra note 10, at
953. The immediate predecessor of the UCMJ was the Articles of War of 1920, ch.
227, tit. 11, 41 Stat. 787, as amended, Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, tit. II, 62 Stat. 627.
14 See Girard, supra note 5, at 464.
15 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8; see, e.g., Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
'OU.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, provides that Congress shall have the power "[tfo make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the fore-
going Powers .... For the scope of the necessary and proper clause, see McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315 (1819). See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19
(1957).
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courts with it if it is to enforce its regulations. 17 And the needs of
military discipline dictate that trial and punishment be swift, necessi-
tating an abbreviation of the prolonged procedures of the civilian
criminal trial.'8  This latter necessity was appreciated by the framers
of the Constitution who did not provide military personnel with all
the procedural safeguards afforded civilians. 19
Because of the procedural deficiencies of the military court-mar-
tial, it has been held unconstitutional to subject civilians to trials by
military courts. 20  Historically, the Army has taken the position that
military jurisdiction does not survive any kind of discharge.2' And
the courts have refused to recognize any distinction between an out-
right discharge and a transfer to the reserves.22 Thus, the rule de-
veloped that unless military jurisdiction attached to a serviceman
while he was on active duty, he could not be tried by a military
court.
2 3
The rule immunizing ex-servicemen from court-martial jurisdic-
tion endured through two world wars. Shortly after World War II,
however, three cases involving servicemen accused of committing
crimes abroad reached the federal courts. Each case highlighted
the jurisdictional gap presented by the lack of military or federal
court jurisdiction over ex-servicemen for crimes taking place while
they were on active duty in a foreign country.
In the 1948 case of Hironimus v. Durant,2 4 the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit was asked to determine the constitutionality of
the court-martial of a WAC officer who had conspired in the theft
17 Comment, supra note 7, at 713.
18 See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 412-13 (T. Cooley ed. 1884).
19 See notes 40-47 infra & accompanying text. See also Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866); Wiener, Courts-martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original
Practice 1, 72 HARv. L REv. I (1958); Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution,
54 HARv. L. REv. 181 (1940).
20 See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (military trial of civilian dependent
held unconstitutional).
21 31 OP. ATr'Y GEN. 521 (1919); see United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Mal-
anaphy, 168 F.2d 503, 507-08 (2d Cir. 1948) (dissenting opinion).2 2 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Santantonio v. Warden, 265 F. 787 (E.D.N.Y.
1919). See also notes 52-56 infra & accompanying text.
23 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949). But cf.
text accompanying notes 57-62 infra.
Basically, military jurisdiction over a person exists only as long as he remains a mil-
itary person; it terminates upon his reversion to civilian status, at which time he again
becomes entitled to the due process of law accorded civilians. There are, however, some
instances when the jurisdiction of the military court validly continues after discharge,
such as when criminal proceedings have begun before the termination of service or
when the person is accused of either fraudulent enlistment or fraudulent discharge. See
W. WINTHROP, supra note 10, at 89-90.
24 168 F.2d 288 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 818 (1948).
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of the crown jewels of Hesse. After committing the crime, the de&-
fendant had returned to the United States. While on "terminal
leave," in anticipation of discharge, she was apprehended by mili-
tary authorities and convicted by court-martial. The court of ap-
peals denied habeas corpus relief but noted that except for her last-
minute arrest the defendant would have been discharged and for-
ever immune from prosecution.
In the 1949 case of In re Lo Dolce,25 a federal district court was
asked to rule whether an ex-serviceman could be extradited to Italy
to stand trial for the murder of an Italian officer which took place
after the American invasion. The court denied extradition because
at the time of the offense the Italian judiciary was not functioning,
and there was consecuently no Italian jurisdiction over the crime.
Thus, the accuised escaped trial because of the lack of military or
federal court jurisdiction over ex-servicemen.
In the third case, United States ex Tel. Hirshberg v. Cooke,2 6 the
active-duty limitation was directly in issue, and the Supreme Court
carried that rule to its furthest extreme. An enlisted man had been a
prisoner of war under the Japanese. He was discharged after his
liberation, but he immediately reenlisted. During his subsequent
term of service, he was court-martialed. for the maltreatment of other
prisoners while a prisoner of war. The Supreme Court held that a
serviceman on active duty could not be court-martiafed for crimes
committed during a prior, term of service. Although the Court com-
mented on the procedural deficiencies of the court-martial, the re-
versal was based on the lack of any statute specifically granting court-
martial jurisdiction over ex-servicemen accused of committing crimes
during a prior enlistment. The Court thus solidified the doctrine
that military jurisdiction terminates forever at the time of a service-
man's release from active duty.
Congress attempted to provide the jurisdiction lacking in the fore-
going cases when it enacted the 1950 UCMJ.27 Article 3 of the 1950
UCMJ provided court-martial jurisdiction over ex-servicemen ac-
cused of having committed serious crimes while on active duty
whenever jurisdiction was absent in the federal or state courts.28
25 106 F. Supp. 455 (W.D.N.Y. 1952).
26 336 U.S. 210 (1949).
27 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970) (originally enacted
as Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107, and originally codified at 50 U.S.C. §§
551-741.
28Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, pt. 1, art. 3, 64 Star. 109, as amended, 10 U.S.C. §
803 (1964). Article 3 (a) provided:
1971] ,
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22: 279
Article 3, clearly an abrupt deviation from the active-duty limita-
tion,' did not go unchallenged for long. In 1955, in the case of
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,30 the Supreme Court was re-
quired to determine the constitutionality of the extended jurisdiction
conferred by article 3.
B. Toth v. Quarles and the Development of the "eStatus" Doctrine
An American serviceman stationed in Korea allegedly participated
in the murder of a Korean civilian. Before his identity was known,
he had been discharged and had returned to the United States. Act-
ing under the authority of article 3, military authorities arrested him
and returned him to Korea to face a court-martial. In habeas corpus
proceedings brought by the accused's sister, the Supreme Court re-
versed the lower court and held article 3 invalid when applied to a
serviceman no longer on active duty?'
Mr. Justice Black, in an opinion joined by five other justices,
focused on the lack of congressional power to provide the jurisdic-
tion found in article 3. He said: "Given its natural meaning, the
power granted Congress to 'make rules' to regulate 'the land and
naval forces' would seem to restrict court-martial jurisdiction to per-
sons who are actually members of the armed forces."82 The majority
and the dissent agreed that the existence of military tribunals is predi-
cated on the need to maintain military discipline and that the scope
of this jurisdiction should be limited by the end that it serves. The
majority, however, considered the scope to be limited to the "least
possible powers adequate to the end proposed." 3 Because the ma-
jority felt that military jurisdiction over ex-servicemen was more than
the minimum jurisdiction necessary to maintain discipline among
troops on active duty, it found such jurisdiction overreaching and in-
Subject to the provisions of article 43, any person charged with having com-
mitted while in a status in which he was subject to this code, an offense against
the code, punishable by confinement for five years or more and for which the
person cannot be tried in the courts of the United States or any State or Ter-
ritory thereof or of the District of Columbia, shall not be relieved from ame-
nability to trial by courts-martial by reason of the termination of said status.
29 See Everett, Military Jurisdiction Over Civilians, 1960 DuKE LJ. 366, 373, where
it is contended that article 3 represented congressional revulsion from Hirshberg. For
a judicial statement that Hironimus and Hirshberg were the reasons for the enactment
of article 3, see United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 26 (1955).
30350 U.S. 11 (1955).
31 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
32 ld. at 15.
-"Id. at 23, quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230-31 (1821).
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valid.34 That other countries had provisions for extended military
jurisdiction similar to the provisions of article 3 was not persuasive.
The Court pointed out that such countries lack the Bill of Rights,
and it was "not willing to hold that power to circumvent those safe-
guards should be inferred through the Necessary and Proper Clause."35
The majority felt that any article I military jurisdiction constitutes an
encroachment on the article III jurisdiction of federal courts3" and
therefore must be limited as much as possible.37
With Toth, the Court began the development of the "status" doc-
trine, an outgrowth of the traditional rule that military jurisdiction
does not survive the termination of active-duty status. Under this
doctrine, a minimum condition which must be met before court-mar-
tial jurisdiction will attach is the determination of the offender's
status as a "person who can be regarded as falling within the term
'land and naval forces.' "38 In a line of cases following Toth, the
Supreme Court decided that the provisions of the UCMJ purporting
to authorize courts-martial of civilians accompanying the armed forces
overseas in peacetime were unconstitutional because such civilians did
not satisfy the minimum "status" requirement 39
34 350 U.S. at 23. The dissent, however, considered the extension of military juris-
diction necessary and proper to prevent releasing, without trial, persons who had com-
mitted crimes in violation of the UCMJ. Justice Reed explained: "Toth may be a civil-
ian but his crime was a violation of military regulations." Id. at 32. "This decision that
a veteran, let out of the military forces before charges, must, by the Constitution, be tried
by the civil courts for his military crimes impairs congressional power [to regulate the
Army and Navy]." Id. at 43.
35 Id. at 22.
36 US. CONST. art. III, § 1, provides in part:
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.
Section 2 of article III defines the judisdiction of the federal courts.
37 350 U.S. at 20. The dissent felt that the majority had inappropriately disregarded
the fact that a limited provision for jurisdiction over ex-servicemen had been enforced as
part of the military law since 1863. Id. at 32-33. See, e.g., Act of March 2, 1863, ch.
67, § 2, 12 Stat. 697, which provided for extended jurisdiction over dischargees who
had perpetrated a fraud upon the government while in the military. The current pro-
vision for such jurisdiction is found at 10 U.S.C. § 803(b) (1964).
38 Kinsella v. United States ex. rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 241 (1960).
39 See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (civilian dependent charged with a
capital offense); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (ci-
vilian dependent charged with a noncapital felony). Girsham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278
(1960) (civilian employee charged with a capital offense); McElroy v. United States ex
rel. Guagiardo, 360 U.S. 281 (1960) (civilian employee charged with a noncapital
felony). See also Bishop, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Military-Civilian Hybrids:
Retained Regulars, Reservists, and Discharged Prisoners, 112 U. PA. L REV. 317 (1964).
The Court has consistently relied on Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866),
which held that military tribunals or military commissions have no jurisdiction over ci-
vilians if the civilian courts are operating.
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The development of the status doctrine can be directly attributed
to the Supreme Court's dissatisfaction with the constitutional and
procedural deficiencies of the military courts. The exigencies of mili-
tary discipline make it impossible to apply all the procedural safe-
guards of the Constitution in court-martial proceedings. In fact, the
Constitution has specifically exempted "cases arising in the land and
naval forces" from the fifth amendment guarantee of grand jury in-
dictment.4° And this exclusionary clause has been construed to dis-
pense with the sixth amendment right to jury trial as well.4
In addition, the summary procedures, speedy trials, and stern
punishments, all predicated upon the necessity for promoting prompt
and unquestioning obedience to military commands and regulations, 42
raise a presumption of procedural deficiencies in court-martial pro-
ceedings.4" And, as stressed by the Toth Court, there is a distinct
possibility of "command influence" affecting every stage of the mili-
tary trial. When contrasted with the independent judiciary and het-
erogeneous jury of the federal courts, this possibility of command
influence completely contravenes the tenet of trial by a fair and im-
partial tribunal." Finally, the deficiencies of courts-martial are com-
40 U. S. CONST. amend. V, provides in part:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time
of War or public danger ....
The last clause modifies only the word "Militia." Thompson v. Willingham, 318 F.2d
657, 658 (3d Cir. 1963). Thus, the exemption applies to all congressionally authorized
article I military tribunals. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14 n.5
(1955). To extend the grand jury requirement to military trials would abridge Con-
gress' article I power to regulate the military through the UCMJ. Id. at 36 (Reed, J.,
dissenting).
41 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40-45 (1942).
4 2 The summary procedures of courts-martial are necessary "to give the first of-
fenders such a slug that others will profit by the example and not do likewise." Hear-
ings on S. 857 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 140 (1949) (statement of Frederick B. Wiener, Esq.).
43 See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 (1957).
44 Justice Black, writing for the majority in Toth, said:
And conceding to military personnel that high degree of honesty and sense of
justice which nearly all of them undoubtedly have, it still remains true that
military tribunals have not been and probably never can be constituted in
such way that they can have the same kind of qualifications that the Constitu-
tion has deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal courts. For
instance, the Constitution does not provide life tenure for those performing
judicial functions in military trials. They are appointed by military com-
manders and may be removed at will. Nor does the Constitution protect their
salaries as it does judicial salaries. Strides have been made toward making
courts-martial less subject to the will of the executive department which ap-
points, supervises and ultimately controls them. But from the very nature of
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pounded by the lack of any general power of review by a court out-
side the military chain of command. 45  A writ of habeas corpus to
the federal courts will provide a review of the courts-martial pro-
ceedings,4 'but only for the limited purpose of determining questions
of jurisdiction.47  Courts have construed jurisdictional questions, how-
ever, to include not only whether the military court had jurisdiction
over the accused and the crime, but also whether the military court
followed the procedure prescribed by the UCMJ.48
things, courts have more independence in passing on the life and liberty of
people than do military tribunals. 350 U.S. at 17.
For similar language, see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36 (1957). There were manifest
possibilities for this command influence to occur under the UCMJ as it existed when
Toth was decided. The commanding officer picked the court, filed the charges, and
chose the prosecuting and defense counsels. See UCMJ arts. 22-24, 26-27, 10 U.S.C.
§§ 822-24, 826-27 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V,, 1970). In 1956, Congress at-
tempted to diminish the possibility of command influence by prohibiting the convening
authority from censuring or admonishing any member of the court. UCMJ art 37, 10
U.S.C. § 837 (1964) (enacted Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, § 837, 70A Stat. 50).
Whether the recent Military Justice Act of 1968, which amended the UCMJ, will be
successful in further alleviating the problem is still an open question. 'See Military
Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (amending scattered sections of
the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. ch. 47 (1964)). The former "law officers" are now "military
judges," 10 U.S.C. §'801(10) (Supp.'V, 1970), formerly ch. 1041, § 801(10), 70A
Stat. 37 (1956), with duties more like those of federal judges. See 10 U.S.C. § 826
(Supp. V, 1970), formerly ch. 1041, § 826, 70A Stat. 46 (1956). These judges are
members of and subject to the commands of the Judge Advocate General Corps. 10
U.S.C. § 82 6 (c) (S-dpp. V, 1970), amending 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1964). The accused
may refuse summary court-martial by a single commissioned officer and be tried by a
special or general court-martial. 10 U.S.C. § 820 (Supp. V, 1970), formerly ch. 1041,
§ 820, 70A Stat. 43 (1956). And the accused may request trial before a judge sitting
alone. 10 U.S.C. §§ 816(1) (B), 816(2) (C) (Supp..V, 1970), amending 10 U.S.C.
§ 816 (1964). For a comprehensive review of the legislative history of the Act, see
Ross, The Military Justice Act of 1968: Historical Background, 23 JAG. J. 123, 125-29
(1969). For a discussion of the ramifications of the Act, see Mounts & Sugarman, The
Military Justice Act of 1968, 55 A.B.A.J. 470 (1969).
45 Court-martial findings are reviewed first by the "convening authority," 10 U.S.C.
§§ 860-64 (1964), and then by the office of the Judge Advocate General, 10 U.S.C. §§
865-66 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970). The defendant then has 30 days to
appeal to the United States Court of Military Appeals, which automatically reviews all
capital cases and has discretionary jurisdiction over all other cases, 10 U.S.C. § 867
(Supp. V, 1970). This court is not under the supervisory powers of the Supreme
Court; it is convened under the Department of Defense and has its own rules of pro-
cedure. The determination of the Court of Military Appeals is final and conclusive.
10 U.S.C. § 876 (1964).
46 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970). See, e.g., Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1 (1957); Barns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 844
(1953).
47 In habeas corpus proceedings, the civil courts have no supervisory powers over
the court-martial. "The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction." In re Grimley, 137
U.S. 147, 150 (1890), upheld in Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 111 (1950). The federal
courts will not grant the writ simply to review the evidence. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S.
137, 142, rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 844 (1953).
48 See, e.g., Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122 (1950). There are indications
that the scope of habeas corpus review of court-martial proceedings may be expanding
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In O'Callahan v. Parker,49 the Supreme Court further demon-
strated its dissatisfaction with the procedural and constitutional de-
ficiencies of military courts. The Court held in O'Callahan that mili-
tary jurisdiction will not attach to an active-duty serviceman accused
of a crime, unless the crime is reasonably connected to the service-
man's military status. " Thus, there are now two conditions which
must exist before military jurisdiction will attach: the accused must
be of the requisite military status, and the crime must be service-con-
nected.5'
C. Military jurisdiction over "Reservists"
Under federal law, qualified male citizens have a 6-year military
obligation.52 A serviceman must spend any part of the 6 years in
which he is not on active duty in some kind of reserve status. 53 Thus,
after a 3 or 4-year enlistment, or a 2-year induction, the serviceman
is released from active duty and transferred to a reserve component of
the force in which he served.6'
and that failure to observe the basic constitutional rights of the accused may also present
a jurisdictional defect. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held in 1969
that the scope of review in military cases should be the same as that in state or federal
cases and that military rulings on constitutional issues must conform to Supreme Court
standards. Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991, 996-97 (D.C. Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1970) (where the defendant raised the issue of an
unconstitutional search and seizure).
49395 U.S. 258 (1969).
5 0 In O'Callahan, an American serviceman was court-martialed for assaulting a young
girl while on leave in Hawaii and out of uniform. The Court held that because the
crime had no connection with the serviceman's military duties, he was not subject to
court-martial jurisdiction.
51The obvious purpose of the O'Callahan holding is to assure that a serviceman
charged with a nonmilitary offense receives a trial by civil jury whenever constitutionally
required. See 395 U.S. at 262-65. Therefore, military courts have held that since the
constitutional guarantee of a jury trial does not extend to petty offenses, such petty
nonservice crimes can be the subject of courts-martial. United States v. Stanley, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 26, 41 C.M.R. 26 (1969). Similarly, since the Constitution does not apply
to foreign courts, military courts have held that foreign nonservice crimes of any degree
of severity may be subject to court-martial. United States v. Keaton, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64,
41 C.M.R. 64 (1969). For a discussion of O'Callahan's effect abroad, see Note, supra
note 8.
5 2 Section 454(a) of the Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. APP. § 454(a)
(Supp. V, 1970), provides in part: "[E]very male citizen of the United States . . . be-
tween the ages of 18 years and 6 months and 26 years ... shall be liable for training
and service in the Armed Forces of the United States ...... The 6-year requirement
is found in 10 U.S.C. § 651(a) (Supp V, 1970).
53 10 U.S.C. § 651 (b) (1964), provides in part: "Each person covered by [section
651(a)] ... shall, upon his release from active duty, be transferred to a reserve com-
ponent of his armed force to complete the service required by subsection (a)."
54 10 U.S.C. § 267(a) (1964), provides for three types of reserve status: ready
reserve, standby reserve, and retired reserve. It also stipulates that each reservist will be
placed in one of those categories. Under 10 U.S.C. § 269(a) (1964), every person
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Under article 2 of the UCMJ, the Code is applicable to those on
the reserve roster, awaiting their formal discharge at the end of the
obligatory 6-year term.5 5 But it has been held that a reservist can-
not be recalled to active duty solely for the purposes of apprehension
and court-martial-56 And it is likely that an attempt to court-martial
a reservist would be interdicted by the "active-duty" -limitation sub-
sumed in the Toth "status" doctrine.
D. Military Jurisdiction Over Reenlisted Servicemen
Despite the unavailability of court-martial jurisdiction over re-
servists, there appears to be one situation in which the military courts
can assume jurisdiction over an individual accused of having com-
mitted a crime on a prior term of active duty; if the ex-serviceman
voluntarily reenlists or volunteers for recall and is recalled, the'mili-
tary jurisdiction automatically revests.
In United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke,57 which arose before
the enactment of article 3 of the 1950 UCMJ,58 the Supreme Court
struck down the court-martial conviction of an active-duty service-
man for a crime committed during a prior enlistment. In addition
to providing the jurisdiction that was later struck down in Toth,
article 3 nullified the Hirshberg holding by providing the jurisdiction
that the Supreme Court had said was lacking in that case. Although
the Toth Court declared article 3 invalid when applied to one who
had severed all connection with the military,59 it did not hold the en-
tire article invalid. Thus, article 3 has been -held by lower federal
courts and military courts to validly grant military jurisdiction over an
ex-serviceman who has reenlisted and who is accused of having com-
mitted a crime during his prior enlistment.60 In the case of Wheeler
required under law to serve in a reserve component goes into either the ready reserve
or standby reserve according to the qualifications contained in section 269.
55 10 U.S.C. § 802(1) (1964), defines those subject to the UCMJ and military
courts-martial, in part, as "Members of a regular component ... including those await-
ing discharge after expiration of their terms of enlistment."
S5 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Viscardi v. MacDonald, 265 F. 695 (E.D.N.Y.
1920) (reservist subject to recall for 6 months after the duration held not amenable
to court-martial). See also United States ex rel. Boscola v. Bledsoe, 152 F. Supp. 343
(W.D. Wash. 1956), aff'd per cm-jam, 245 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1957); United States
ex rel. Santantonio v. Warden, 265 F. 787 (E.D.N.Y. 1919). Both cases invalidated
the recall of reservists into the military for purposes of court-martial.
57336 U.S. 210 (1949) (discussed in text following note 26 supra).
n8Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, pt. 1, art. 3 64 Star. 109, as amended, 10 U.SC. §
803 (1964). See note 28 supra.
59 350 U.S. at 14. But see id. at 44-45, where Mr. Justice Minton in dissent ex-
pressed the opinion that Toth had not severed all connection with the military.
60United States ex rel. Atkinson v. Kish, 176 F. Supp. 820 (M.D. Pa. 1959);
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v. Reynolds, 1 for example, the accused had committed a murder
in Germany. After his release from active duty and return to the
United States, he was confronted with allegations by civilian and
military investigative bodies and freely confessed the crime. Al-
though article 3 applied, the ruling in Toth barred the military au-
thorities from prosecuting. The accused, however, feared extradition
to Germany and reenlisted. Shortly thereafter court-martial proceed-
ings were begun. A federal district court denied his plea for habeas
corpus relief from the ensuing military trial, holding that article 3
had nullified the Hirshberg holding and that article 3 is not affected
by the Toth rule when applied to one who has reenlisted. The
court-martial conviction was affirmed by the Court of Military Ap-
peals.62 If this issue ever reaches the Supreme Court, a literal ap-
plication of the status doctrine will uphold the Wheeler rule because
the defendant will have been on active duty both when the crime was
committed and when the military jurisdiction was asserted. But in
light of the Court's dissatisfaction with court-martial proceedings, it
is likely that it will view jurisdiction like that exercised in Wheeler as
more than that necessary to maintain discipline among active-duty
troops.6
III. FOREIGN COURT JURISDICTION OVER EX-SERVICEMEN
By MEANS OF ExTRADITION
A. Adequacy and Availability of Foreign Court jurisdiction
An American citizen is not immune from a foreign trial for a
crime committed in a foreign country, even though the laws of that
country may not provide safeguards similar to those found in the
United States Constitution." And it has been held constitutional to
permit extradition of American citizens to the situs of the crime for
the purpose of trial.65
The idea that an American citizen can be tried by a foreign court
is disconcerting to a large segment of the American public.66 There
United States v. Gallagher, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 506, 22 C.M.R. 296 (1957). But see United
States v. Ginyard, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 512, 37 C.M.R. 132 (1967).
61164 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Fla. 1958).
6 2 United States v. Wheeler, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 646, 28 C.M.R. 212 (1959).
6 3 See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
6 4 Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122 (1901); Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (dictum).
6 5 Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901); cf. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
66 Some organizations, such as the Veterans of Foreign Wars, have gone on record as
advocating the rescission of treaties which grant concurrent jurisdiction to the host state
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is a common belief that foreign courts are harsh on defendants. 7
Some contemporary writers, however, have taken the position that
criminal justice in most countries is about as advanced as our own.6 8
And a 1957 study indicated that in the NATO countries the overall
protection given defendants was equal to that guaranteed in the
state courts.39
Under early international law, military personnel of a visiting
force enjoyed a limited immunity from the territorial jurisdiction of
the host country.70 In the absence of a treaty to the contrary, the host
country would generally not exercise jurisdiction in such a way as to
impair the efficiency and objectives of the visiting force.71  Immunity
from the host country's jurisdiction still seems to be the rule in times
of hostility or belligerency. 72  But the contemporary rule of interna-
tional law is that the host country has exclusive jurisdiction to punish
offenses against its laws committed by a member of a visiting force
in time of peace, unless that jurisdiction is expressly waived in an
agreement between the governments involved.7
and the military authorities over active-duty personnel accused of committing crimes
abroad. See Hearings on H.R. Res. 8704 Before the House Comm. on Armed Services,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3,572 (1957).
67 See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 89 (1957) (Clark, J., dissenting).6 8 See, e.g., Girard, The Constitution and Court-Martial of Civilians Accompanying
the Armed Forces - A Preliminary Analysis, 13 STAN. L. REv. 461, 506 (1961).
For a study of the adeqtiacy of foreign tribunals in those countries with which the
United States has "Status of Forces Agreements" (treaties which define the jurisdic-
tional limits of the military and the host state, see notes 76-84 infra & accompanying
text), see Re, The NATO Status of Forces Agreement and International Law, 50 Nw.
U.L. REV. 349 (1955).
6 9 Schwenk, Comparative Study of the Law of Criminal Procedure in NATO Coun-
tries Under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 35 N.C.L. REv. 358, 378 (1957).
The study was based, however, on a comparison with the then existing state procedures,
which, to a great extent, were affected only by the "fundamental fairness" doctrine which
surrounded the 14th amendment at that time. Thus, many rights not enjoyed in foreign
courts were similarly not enforced in the state courts. Through the increased
acceptance of the "incorporation doctrine," many additional constitutional guarantees
are now applicable to state court proceedings. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968) (jury trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right of confronta-
tion); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-incrimination). Thus, the study has
lost some of its validity.7 0 See J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 223 (6th ed.
1967). See also Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 165 (1879); Coleman v. Tennessee,
97 U.S. 509, 516 (1878). In Coleman, the Court stated: "It is well settled that a for-
eign army permitted to march through a friendly country, or to be stationed in it, by
permission of its government or sovereign is exempt from the civil and criminal juris-
diction of the place." Id. at 515.
7 1 See J. STARKE, supra note 70, at 233.
72 Myers & Kaplan, Crime Without Punishment, 35 GEO. L J. 303, 310-11 (1947).
73 See Wilson v. Girard, 354 US. 524 (1957); Schwartz, International Law and
the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1091 (1953). But see
King, Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces, 36 AM. J. INT'L L 539
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The United States can extend its criminal laws to Americans in
foreign lands, 4 and it has done so in the form of the UCMJ. But its
ability to enforce the UCMJ in foreign countries depends on the co-
operation of the host governments.7' Thus, the United States has
jurisdiction agreements with at least 50 nations in which it has sta-
tioned troops.76 These agreements, usually known as Status of Forces
Agreements77 (SOFA's), allocate jurisdiction over servicemen's crimes
between the courts of the host and visiting powers.7 8  The UCMJ,
relying on the jurisdictional grants in these SOFA's, provides that its
provisions are applicable to United States Armed Forces "in all
places" where they might be located.79
When the crime is cognizable under the laws of the host country
but not under the UCMJ, or when the military courts are prohibited
by case law from exerting jurisdiction over the crime, 0 an existing
(1942). The Supreme Court said in 1812 that "[t]he jurisdiction of a nation, within
its own territory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation
not imposed by itself." Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136
(1812).
74 See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932).
7 5See Girard, supra note 68, at 464.
76 Id.
77 For a discussion of Status of Forces Agreements, see Carlisle, Official Duty Cer-
tificates Under Status of Forces Agreements, 20 JAG. J. 95 (1966). See also Note,
Military Jurisdiction Over Crimes Committed by Military Personnel Outside the United
States: The Effect of O'Callahan v. Parker, 68 Mi. L REV. 1016, 1025-29 (1970).
For a comprehensive study of foreign court jurisdiction, focusing on Status of Forces
Agreements, see Note, Criminal Jurisdiction Over American Armed Forces Abroad, 70
HARv. L. REV. 1043 (1957).
78Most SOFA's provide that:
a) Crimes cognizable under the host state's laws but not under the laws of the
visiting state are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the host state;
b) Crimes cognizable under the laws of the visiting power but not under the laws
of the host state are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the visiting military au-
thorities;
c) For all other crimes there is concurrent jurisdiction, and the host state has
primary jurisdiction unless
1) the offense is solely against the property or security of the visiting force,
or solely against the person or property of a member of that force or its civilian
component, or
2) the offense arises out of the performance of an official duty of a member
of the visiting force. See Note, Criminal Jurisdiction Over American Armed
Forces Abroad, 70 HARV. L REV. 1043 (1957).
See also Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the
Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, [1953] 2 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199
U.N.T.S. 67; Agreement under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Re-
public of Korea Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Forces in
the Republic of Korea, July 9, 1966, [1966) 2 U.S.T. 1677, T.I.A.S. No. 6127.
79 10 U.S.C. § 805 (1964).
80 See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (military dependent covered by a
SOFA did not have the requisite status for court-martial).
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SOFA automatically vests jurisdiction in the tribunals of the host
government.8 And even when the military has primary jurisdiction
over an offender, it may defer to the concurrent domestic jurisdiction
under a SOFA. In Wilson v. Girard,82 the Supreme Court allowed
waiver of court-martial jurisdiction where a treaty existed giving con-
current jurisdiction to the Japanese and military courts.83 The Court
held that no statutory or constitutional provision prohibited the
United States from waiving any right it had to exercise jurisdiction
over the soldier.
That a SOFA was in effect when a serviceman committed a crime
while on active duty in a foreign country does not immunize him
from foreign court jurisdiction after his release from active duty.
Under a SOFA, the foreign country simply allows the United States
to exercise a limited amount of jurisdiction; it does not give up its
own jurisdiction. Thus, even when a host country grants the United
States primary jurisdiction over certain military-related offenses, it
retains jurisdiction over these offenses through its territorial sov-
ereignty.8
B. Extradition
The normal method of exercising jurisdiction over an accused
party no longer present in the territory of the crime is by extradition
provided for in a treaty. 5 The traditional authorities took the posi-
tion that extradition was a matter of right; 6 but the United States
recognizes no right to extradition apart from a treaty."7 It has been
8 1 See note 78 supra, Baldwin, Foreign Jurisdiction and the American Soldier, 1958
Wis. L REV. 52, 62.
82354 US. 524 (1957).
8 3 The waiver was authorized under the SOFA between Japan and the United States:
Protocol to Amend Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement Under Article III
of the Security Treaty with Japan, Sept. 29, 1953, [19531 2 U.S.T. 1846, T.I.A.S. No.
2848; Administrative Agreement Under Article iMI of the Security Treaty with Japan,
Feb. 28, 1952, [19523 3 U.S.T. 3341, T.T.A.S. No. 2492.
84 See note 73 supra & accompanying text
8 5 The procedure for extradition is found in the American extradition statutes, 18
U.S.C. § 3181-95 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970).
86 See 1 L OPPENHEiM, INTERNATIONATL LAw 696 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
See generally Bassiouni, International Extradition: A Summary of the Cotemporary
American Practice and a Proposed Formula, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 733, 734 (1969).
8718 U.S.C. § 3184 (Supp. V, 1970), requires a "treaty or convention . . . be-
tween the United States and any foreign government" requesting extradition. See, e.g.,
Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933). But see IV J. MOORE, DIGEST ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW, EXTRADITION § 581, at 249 (1906), for a comment on an in-
stance when the United States allowed extradition of a Spaniard in the absence of a
treaty with Spain.
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held constitutional to allow the extradition of American nationals to
a foreign country under an existing treaty,88 but that treaty must be
found to provide for the extradition of citizens.89 The United
States is a party to three kinds of extradition treaties: (1) unlimited,
calling for the extradition of all persons;9" (2) restricted, providing
that neither of the contracting parties shall deliver its own citizens for
extradition;-91 and (3) discretionary, providing that neither party shall
be required to extradite its own citizens, but allowing the Executive
discretion to deliver them at the other country's request. 2 Although
the policy of the United States has been to seek the omission of any
provision exempting its own nationals from extradition, most of the
treaties to which it is a party are restricted treaties due to the in-
sistence of other nations.93
A primary requirement that must be met before extradition will
be allowed under an extradition treaty is jurisdiction; both the juris-
diction of the requesting state over the crime and the present juris-
diction of the requested state over the person of the accused must be
shown.94 Under American precedent, the requesting state can meet
its jurisdictional requirement only by showing actual jurisdiction over
S8 Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
89 Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936).
9 0 E.g., Extradition Treaty with Great Britain, Dec. 22, 1931, 47 Star. 2122 (1932),
T.S. No. 849. The United States has extradited her own nationals under such a treaty,
notwithstanding the requesting nation's consistent refusal to extradite its nationals to
the United States. See Charleton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
91 E.g., Extradition Treaty with France, Jan. 6, 1909, 37 Stat. 1526 (1911), T.S.
No. 561.
92E.g., Extradition Treaty with Mexico, Feb. 22, 1899, 31 Stat. 1818 (1899), T.S.
No. 242. The State Department refused to surrender four Americans to Mexico in the
late 1940's, reminding the Mexican government that it had consistently refused to ex-
tradite Mexicans to the United States. Bassiouni, supra note 86, at 750.
93 Bassiouni, supra note 86, at 750; see IV G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW § 318, at 55 (U.S. Dept. of State ed. 1940); 1 J. MOORE, EXTRADITION
159-77 (1891). See also Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention
on Extradition, 29 AM. J. INT'L L SuPP. 21, 22, 123 (1935).
94 There are five principles of jurisdiction in international law: (1) territorial jur-
isdiction based on jurisdiction over the situs of the offense; (2) the nationality principle
of jurisdiction of a state over its citizens no matter where they are found; (3) the pro-
tective principle, or jurisdiction based on the necessity for protection of the national
interest, (4) the universality principle based on custodianship over the accused no mat-
ter what his nationality or where the offense was committed; and (5) the passive per-
sonality principle based on the nationality of the victim or of the plaintiff in a civil suit.
Introductory Comment to Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 443, 445 (1935). Ameri-
can precedent limits the permissible jurisdiction of the requesting state to the first type.
See note 95 infra & accompanying text.
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the crime, the parties thereto, and the territory where the crime was
committed at the time of the offense.9 5
Most United States bilateral extradition treaties contain a list of
extraditable offenses,96 which usually includes the common repre-
hensible crimes - for example, murder, kidnapping, counterfeiting,
fraud, and slavery - and other crimes which may be causing mutual
problems for the contracting parties, such as trafficking in narcotics.
7
There may be specific exclusions of some crimes. 8 In most cases, the
extraditable crime must be one actually cognizable as a "crime" under
the criminal laws of both the requesting and requested countries.9
Because the Constitution places an extradition treaty on the same
level as a statute, the judiciary will generally not impede its func-
tion.100 Following the filing of a complaint and request for extradi-
tion, an "extradition magistrate," either a federal judge or a United
States commissioner, issues a warrant for the arrest of the defendant
and holds a hearing to determine whether the requesting state has
shown reasonable grounds for extradition."' 1 At the magistrate's
hearing, the evidence need not comply with the "beyond a reason-
able doubt" standard that would be required in a criminal trial. The
evidence must only be "such as to afford reasonable ground to be-
lieve that the accused is guilty of the offense charged."' 1 2 Upon a
95 1n re Lo Dolce, 106 F. Supp. 455 (W.D.N.Y. 1952) (where extradition was,
refused the Italian government because at the time the offense was committed on Italian
soil the Germans were occupying Italy and had preempted the Italian jurisdiction). For
a discussion of the requirements for extradition in American law, see Bassiouni, supra
note 86.
90W. BIsHoP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 471 (2d ed.
1962).
97 Note, The New Extradition Treaties of the United States, 59 AM J. INY'L L.
351, 355 (1965). The offense may have to be defined in the treaty because of differ-
ences in the laws of the contracting parties. Id. at 356. See also Draft Convention on
Extradition, supra note 93, at 72-86.
98Extradition for "military offenses" is prohibited by some treaties, but the term
is rarely defined. Note, supra note 97, at 360.
9 9 See, e.g., Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922).
100 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, provides in part: "This Constitution . . . and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound there-
by .. " Mr. Chief Justice Marshall wrote: "Our constitution declares a treaty to be the
law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to
an act of the legislature, whenever, it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative
provision." Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
101 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (Supp. V, 1970). United States substantive law applies at the
magistrate's hearing. Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 61 (1903).
102 United States ex rel. Lo Pizzo v. Mathues, 36 F.2d 565, 568 (3d Cir. 1929)
(note supplementing opinion). Evidentiary matters are controlled by 18 U.S.C. §
3190 (1964).
19711
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22: 279
finding that reasonable grounds for extradition exist, the magistrate
incarcerates the accused and certifies the evidence and transcript of the
hearing to the Secretary of State in order that a warrant may issue
for the surrender of the accused to the requesting state. 03 The de-
cision of the magistrate is not subject to appellate review. The ac-
cused has the right to petition for habeas corpus relief, however, and
upon that petition a federal court may inquire into the legal aspects
of the detention and commitment - the compliance with the extradi-
tion treaty and controlling statutes, and the competence of the evi-
dence. 04
The United States Code lists bilateral extradition treaties with 81
countries. 0 5 A review of that listing shows extant treaties with most
of the countries where the United States has deployed troops, with the
notable exception of South Vietnam. Whether an ex-serviceman is
subject to extradition under one of these treaties, however, will de-
pend upon the treaty's provisions for extradition or nonextradition
of American nationals, the meeting of the jurisdictional requirements
under the treaty, and the finding of reasonable grounds for extradi-
tion. Due to the great variety of treaty provisions, it is difficult to
state any general rule about the availability of extradition; each case
must be determined on the basis of the treaty with the country in-
volved. Considering the prevalence of restricted' 6 treaties, however,
in most cases the foreign court will be unable to exercise its jurisdic-
tion once the offender has returned to the United States and has been
discharged.
IV. FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION OVER EX-SERVICEMEN
FOR CRIMES COMMITTED ABROAD
To close the gap presented by the Toth holding, Congress should
enact legislation conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts to try
Americans charged with committing serious crimes abroad, particu-
103 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (Supp. V, 1970). See also 19 U.S.C. § 3186 (1964) (order
of the Secretary of State to deliver the accused to an agent of the foreign government);
id. § 3188 (the accused must be delivered within 2 months after the magistrate's deter-
mination).
104 W. BISHOP, supra note 96, at 474; see Factor v. laubenheimer, 61 F.2d 626
(7th Cir. 1932), aff'd, 290 U.S. 276 (1933); Kutner, Habeas Corpus and International
Extradition, in INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, TENTH CONFERENCE REPORT 246,
250 (1964).
105 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (Supp. V, 1970). There are 135 treaties or treaty supple-
ments controlling extradition with these 81 countries.
106 See text accompanying note 93 supra.
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larily ex-servicemen charged with violations of the UCMJ that are
not discovered prior to their discharge. °7
A. Lack of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Under international law, most countries recognize two ways for
jurisdiction over the person to attach: (1) through jurisdiction over
the offender assumed by the nation which has control over the situs
of the crime; or (2) assumption of jurisdiction over the person by
the state of which -he is a citizen.108 The second, a theory of extra-
territorial jurisdiction, is a valid principle of international law,109 but
the United States, Great Britain, and several other countries recognize
only the first, a strict theory of territorial jurisdiction.110
The Constitution does not prohibit the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction over American citizens abroad. It can be inferred that
the Framers of the Constitution anticipated a form of extraterritorial
jurisdiction when they provided in article II that Congress can pro-
vide for the trial of crimes "not committed within any' State.""'
107 When the UCMJ was enacted in 1950, the Judge Advocate General of the Army
made a strong plea to Congress to confer such jurisdiction on the federal courts rather
than the military courts:
If you expressly confer jurisdiction on the Federal courts to try such cases,
you preserve the constitutional separation of military and civil courts, you
save the military from a lot of unmerited grief, and you provide for a clean,
constitutional method for disposing of such cases. Hearings on S. 857 and
H.R. 4080 Before Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Armed Forces, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 256-57 (1949).
Other opponents of article 3 also expressed the need for federal jurisdiction. See 96
CONG. REC. 1294, 1366, 1412-17 (1950). In response to a questionnaire submitted
to the various branches of the armed services by the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1962,
the Army, Navy, and Air Force favored vesting the jurisdiction in the federal courts.
Hearings on S. Res. 260 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 852, 910, 946 (1962). "However, since
the persons involved are civilians not under the jurisdiction of the Department of De-
fense, the Department of Defense defers to the Department of Justice on the means that
should be taken to fill the jurisdictional gap . I..." d. at 946. Mr. Justice Black, writ-
ing the majority opinion in Toth conceded that such jurisdiction was constitutionally
permissible. 350 U.S. at 21; accord, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 47 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
'0sJ. STARKE, supra note 70, at 238.
109 Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, supra note 94, at 519.
See also W. BISHOP, supra note 96, at 439.
110 The normal justification for adopting the first theory is that it is more convenient
for the crime to be punished by the nation most affected by the crime, which is usually
the nation where the crime was committed. J. STARKE, supra note 70, at 215.
111 U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, provides in part:
The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and
such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at
such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
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Congress early provided that "the trial of crimes committed on the
high seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular
state, shall be in the district where the offender is apprehended, or
into which he may first be brought.""' 2 Article III might be further
construed to authorize Congress to designate those federal courts
which are to hear a full range of extraterritorial cases. It is generally
accepted, however, that the laws of Congress, including its criminal
laws, "unless the contrary intent appears, [are] construed to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States ...."I"
Therefore, the vesting of federal courts with the power to hear extra-
territorial cases must be accompanied by the augmentation of the pres-
ent criminal codes to include crimes committed by citizens abroad.
Presently, only a few criminal statutes extend beyond the territory of
the United States,1 4 and those statutes apply to only a few of the of-
fenses which must be covered to adequately cope with the problems
wrought by America's military omnipresence." 5 Some extraterritorial
jurisdiction is extended to murder and manslaughter," 6 but it exists in
only a few of the places where the United States stations its troops;
the jurisdiction extends basically to the high seas and the islands or
territories under the direct control of the federal government.117 More
extensive extraterritorial jurisdiction is necessary to correct the exist-
ing jurisdictional deficiencies.
B. Proposed Jurisdiction
Although the necessary jurisdiction could be created by amending
the present extraterritorial statutes to give them a more wide-ranging
application, a better alternative would be to enact legislation aimed
11 2 Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 114. The present provision for trying
offenses not committed within any state is found in 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1964).
113 Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932). But see Skiriotes v.
Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941). When a criminal statute deals with acts which are di-
rectly injurious to the government and capable of perpetration outside the territorial
confines of the United States, the act will be construed to apply extraterritorially. Id.
at 73-74.
114 See notes 116-17 infra.
1 15 See generally H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1086-1100 (1953).
116 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (B) (1964), provides for the punishment of murders com-
mitted within the special territorial and maritime jurisdiction of the United States. Id.
§ 1112 (B), provides similar sanctions for manslaughter.
"17 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1964), defines the special maritime and territorial jurisdic-
tion as jurisdiction over American vessels and aircraft on or over the high seas, federal
enclaves, and "[any island, rock, or key containing deposits of guano .. .appertaining
to the United States."
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explicitly at the ex-serviceman. Proposals have been made in Con-
gress to amend article 3 of the -UCMJ to establish federal court juris-
diction over ex-servicemen. 118 A recent proposal by Senator Ervin of
North Carolina would amend article 3 to read:
(a) Subject to section 843 of this title (artide 43), any person
not subject to trial by court-martial who is charged with having com-
mitted, while in a status in which he was subject to trial by court-
martial, an offense against this chapter punishable by confinement
for five years or more, and who, while in such status, was not tried
for such offense may be tried upon indictment for such offense -
(1) ...
(2) in the United States district court for the judicial district in
which such person is found or into which he is first brought, if such
offense was committed outside the United States or on the high
seas.... For the purpose of all proceedings for or ancillary to the
trial of any person for any such offense in any district court of the
United States, such offense shall be considered to be an offense
prohibited by and punishable under the provisions of title 18,
United States Code.119
In introducing the bill, Senator Ervin noted that it complied with a
suggestion by Justice Black in the Toth opinion that federal court
jurisdiction be provided, and that it would fill the jurisdictional gap
118 S. 761, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) [hereinafter cited as S. 761], was intended
to establish such jurisdiction, but did not get out of committee. Senator Ervin of
North Carolina, who had introduced the bill, stated that the bill would not only fill
the jurisdictional gap but "would comply with the constitutional requirements set out
by the Supreme Court .... " Joint Hearings [on S. 761 and other matters] Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and a Special
Subcomm. of the Senate Armed Forces Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966) [here-
inafter cited as Joint Hearings]. The Assistant Secretary of Defense requested that S.
761 be deferred until the Defense Department could come up with an alternative. Id.
at 13. Others represented at the Hearings were generally in favor of the bill. The
Federal Bar Association favored enactment:
The [association's] committee is in wholehearted agreement that legislation
authorizing an American forum to try'American nationals for serious offenses
committed overseas is essential and that, U.S. District Courts are the appro-
priate American forum for this purpose.... To us it is inconceivable that
substantial groups of Americans who are abroad on behalf of the Govern-
ment should be immune from all criminal responsibility for such serious
crimes as murder, rape, robbery and assaults. Memorandum: Jurisdiction over
Civilians Abroad and Former Service Personnel, Federal Bar Association,
reprinted in id. at 837.
The Justice Department, however, opposed the legislation: "The Department states that
it is opposed to S. 761 because the enactment of such legislation would create burden-
some administrative problems." Joint Hearings, supra at 638.
Similar legislation had been introduced in 1956, S. 2791 & H.R. 81, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1956), but also failed to get out of committee.
119 S. 3188, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (proposed on Dec. 1, 1969). The bill
is still in the Judiciary Committee and will probably not emerge before the summer of
1971. Telephone conversation with Jack Spain, administrative assistant to Senator Er-
vin, Dec. 18, 1970.
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which had existed since 1955.12° If the above amendment is adopted
no additional legislation will be necessary. It provides the jurisdic-
tion and the existing UCMJ provides the list of indictable offenses.
Granted, there will be practical problems involved in domestic
trials of foreign crimes. The problem of obtaining witnesses pre-
sents the greatest difficulty. American citizens abroad can be sub-
poenaed to appear at trial,"' and there would be no difficulty in get-
ting servicemen to appear. There is, however, no existing system for
subpoening foreign nationals to appear as witnesses in domestic crimi-
nal proceedings. Their attendance could be achieved only on a volun-
tary basis.
The problem of unavailable defense witnesses could be partially
alleviated by the use of depositions under Rule 15 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.122  And the deposition of a prosecu-
tion witness is admissable if it is taken in the presence of defense
counsel having an adequate opportunity to cross-examine.2 3 But even
though the deposition of a foreign national may thus be constitution-
ally admissible, American courts lack direct subpoena power to com-
pel attendance at the taking of a deposition. 2 4 Thus, obtaining a
foreign witness' deposition will depend on either voluntary witness
participation or the use of letters rogatory to the foreign courts. 5
These problems involved in obtaining foreign witnesses will often
make prosecution difficult. But even if prosecutions have to be re-
stricted to selected cases, this is in some measure the situation with
regard to law enforcement in general and is certainly no reason for
failing to prosecute altogether.
The domestic trial of an extraterritorial crime presents the addi-
tional problem of complying with the sixth amendment guarantee of
a "trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
120 115 CONG. REc. 36,154 (1969) (statement of Senator Ervin).
121 Subpoena powers of the defense and prosecution in the federal courts are gov-
erned by FED. R. CRIM. P. 17. A subpoena directed to a witness in a foreign country
is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1964).
iFED. R. CRIM. P. 15(e), allows the defendant to introduce depositions of wit-
nesses who are out of the United States.
123 See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165-66 (1970).
124 FED. P_ CRM. P. 17 (f), provides subpoena power to compel the taking of depo-
sitions, and FED, R. CRIM. P. 17(e) (2), provides that any subpoena of a witness in a
foreign country shall be served as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1964). This statute,
known as the Walsh Act, applies only to nationals or residents of the United States in
a foreign country, however; and a subpoena cannot be issued under the Act to an alien
who owes no allegiance to the United States. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDuRE § 277, at 564 (1969).
12 5 See 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1964).
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crime shall have been committed .2. . Trial by an American jury
would not satisfy the requirement that the jury be drawn from the
place of the crime. Article III, however, also guarantees trial by jury
and provides that "when not committed within any State, the Trial
shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have di-
rected."'127 The journal of the Constitutional Convention kept by
James Madison reveals that the quoted portion of article III was in-
serted in an amendment "to provide for trial by jury of offenses com-
mitted out of any state."'128 Thus, it appears that there would be no
constitutional impediment to providing a jury from the "district
in which the offender.. ; is arrested or is first brought .... 12 0
V. My LAI AND THE JURISDICTIONAL GAP
This Note has dealt generally with the subject of ex-servicemen
accused of committing crimes abroad. This section focuses on the
narrower topic of "war crimes," such as those allegedly committed
at My Lai. It will be shown that United States jurisdiction over ex-
servicemen for offenses such as those which occurred at My Lai is
not merely desirable, it is obligatory under international law.
During the autumn of 1969, a company of American ffifantry -
men allegedly obliterated the civilian population of a small peasant
village known to the military authorities as My Lai 4.130 The mil-
itary has begun court-martial proceedings against many of the indi-
viduals implicated in the crime.' A significant number of service-
men involved in the incident, however, were released from active
duty between the time the offenses were allegedly committed and the
time they were disclosed. These men will not be brought to trial in
any court. The military and federal courts are foreclosed by the
126 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .
127 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see note 111 supra.
128 3 MADISON PAPERs 1441 (H. Gilpin ed. 1842).
129 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1964); see S. 3188(a) (2), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969),
which is set out in the text accompanying note 119 supra.
130 For a complete report of the incident and the journalistic and governmental re-
sponse, see S. HERSH, MY LAI 4: A REPoRT ON THE MASSAcRE AN ITS AFTERmATH
(1970). For a discussion of the legal implications involved in the My Lai incident, see
Rubin, Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident, 49 ORE. L REv. 260 (1970). For a
comprehensive overview of the Nixon administration's response to the incident, see
Comment, My 1a Massacre: The Need for an International Investigation, 58 CALIF. L.
REV. 703 (1970).
1 31 See Comment, supra note 130, at 715-16.
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Toth rule' and the lack of extraterritorial jurisdiction.13 3 And the
ex-servicemen cannot be extradited to South Vietnam to stand trial
because there is presently no extradition treaty between the United
States and South Vietnam. Even if there were an extradition
treaty, however, it would have no effect in the My Lai situation be-
cause other liberal treaty provisions with South Vietnam have given
American servicemen stationed in that country virtual immunity
from its criminal jurisdiction.134 Thus, one of the requirements for
extradition - jurisdiction over the offender at the time of the of-
fense'35 - is lacking. Consequently, there is no forum in which the
ex-servicemen accused of the My Lai offenses can be tried.
Notwithstanding the United States present lack of jurisdiction
over ex-servicemen charged with war crimes committed on foreign
soil, the Constitution authorizes Congress to provide such jurisdic-
tion. Article I, section 8, of the Constitution gives Congress the
power "to define and punish ...Offenses against the Law of Na-
tions."' " The war crimes allegedly committed at My Lai are in the
category of such offenses.' 3 7
"The law of nations" can be equated with "international law" -
that body of rules established by universal consent among the na-
tions of the world.'31  The "laws of war," a branch of international
law, seek to govern the conduct of nations participating in wars and
the conduct of their citizens in the latters' actions toward the enemy
132 See text accompanying notes 31-39 supra.
133 See notes 108-117 supra & accompanying text.
134 Agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina with Cambodia, France,
Laos, and Vietnam, Dec. 23, 1950, [1952] 3 U.S.T. 2756, T.I.A.S. No. 2447. Article
IV of the treaty provides that any personnel assigned to uphold the defense of one of
the parties "will in their relations to the Government of the country to which they are
assigned, operate as part of the diplomatic mission under the direction and control of
the Chief of such missions of the Government which they are serving." As part of the
diplomatic mission, the forces are afforded diplomatic immunity from prosecution. See
Note, The Geneva Convention of 1949: Application in the Vietnamese Conflict, 5 VA. J.
INT'L L. 243, 244 (1965).
135 See notes 94-95 supra & accompanying text.
136 For a general discussion of the congressional powers under the "offenses" clause,
see Comment, The Offense Clause: Congress' International Penal Power, 8 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 279 (1969).
'37 Cf. note 140 infra.
1384 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 66 (W. Lewis ed. 1897). Some com-
mentators distinguish between the "law of nations" and "international law." See, e.g.,
R-heinstein, The Constitutional Basis of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHi. L. REV. 775, 802-17
(1955). But because most writers make no distinction, the two will be treated synony-
mously herein.
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and civilians in the area of hostility. 39 Nations are, "according to
the Law of Nations, in a sense responsible for... certain unauthor-
ized injurious acts of their... subjects ....140 The United States,
especially the Department of Defense, should be held accountable
for the actions of its military personnel abroad, whose presence in a
foreign land is the direct result of governmental fiat. 4 ' The "of-
fenses" clause grants Congress the authority to accept this responsi-
bility and to punish crimes against international law perpetrated by
American servicemen.4'
Historically, the United States has recognized its duty under in-
ternational law to control its armed forces abroad. It has ratified
numerous treaties and agreements regulating the conduct of war,"
as well as the SOFA agreements regulating the jurisdiction over its
armed forces in time of peace." It has also joined in resolutions
and agreements designed to protect the rights of civilian noncom-
batants.'45
In 1899, the United States signed the Hague Agreements which
bound the contracting parties to respect general concepts of human-
itarianism when engaged in war. 46 But vague definitions of the
law of war and the mere condemnation of war crimes proved to be
ineffective during the Second World War. The Nazis' disregard
for fundamental standards of human decency convinced the allies
that war crimes could be effectively deterred only by punishing the
individual offenders. Therefore, the four major allies signed the
1 39 See Myers & Kaplan, supra note 72, at 317-18. See also J. STARKE, supra note
70, at 439.
14 0 L OPPENHEIM, supra note 86, at 337. Mr. Justice Story once wrote:
As the United States are responsible to foreign governments for all violations
of the law of nations, and as the welfare of the Union is essentially connected
with the conduct of our citizens, in regard to foreign nations, Congress ought
to possess the power to define and punish all such offenses, which may in-
terrupt our intercourse and harmony with, and our duties to them. 2 J.
STORY, THE CONSTITUTION 90 (5th ed. 1891).
141 This aspect of international law, holding a nation responsible for the acts of its
military personnel abroad, has been affirmatively incorporated into the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949. Cf. text accompanying notes 163-64 infra.
142 International law recognizes that offenses against the law of nations are com-
mirted by men as well as governments. See, e.g., 1 TRIALs Or WAR CRIMINALS BE-
FoRE THE NUERNBERG MIUITARY TRIBUNALS 8-17 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office ed.
1946-1949).
143 See, e.g., text accompanying note 146 infra.
144 See notes 76-83 supra & accompanying text
145 See text accompanying notes 146-56, 160-64 infra.
146 Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July
29, 1899, 32 Sta. 1803 (1902), T.S. No. 539.
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London Agreement 47 which provided for the trial of German "war
criminals." The Charter later added to that agreement established
the constitution and the rules of procedure for the international mil-
itary tribunal set up to try those accused of war crimes. 48 In 1946,
the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution affirming
the principles of international law found in the Charter and directed
a committee to formulate an "International Code" encompassing
those principles." 9 Pursuant to that resolution, the "Nuernberg
Principles" were presented to the General Assembly in 1950.15
Those Principles provided that any person who commits a crime
against international laws of war is liable, regardless of the lack of
domestic criminal sanctions and regardless of any "superior or-
der."'' Although the "Nuemberg Principles" were never codified
by the United Nations, they stand as the contemporary model state-
ment of responsibility for war crimes: The individual offender
should be held accountable. This concept of individual responsi-
bility was carried forward into the Geneva Conventions.' 52
On August 12, 1949, the United States, France, Vietnam, and
other parties signed the Geneva Conventions'53 proposed by the In-
ternational Red Cross. Pertinent to the present discussion are the
Civilian Convention' 54 and the Prisoner of War Convention.' 5 Im-
147 Agreement by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional
Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the Euro-
pean Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544 (1945), E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 280. See
1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS at ix
(U.S. Gov't Printing Office ed. 1946-1949) [hereinafter cited as 1 TRIALS].
148 For the text of the Charter, Aug. 8, 1945, as amended, Oct. 6, 1945, see 59
Stat. 1546 (1945), E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 284. See also 1 TRIALs, supra note
147, at xi.
141)G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946), cited in THE CHARTER AND
JUDGMENT OF THE NtTRNBERG TRIBUNAL, U.N. Pub. No. 1949, v.7, at 14-15 (1949).
150 U.N. GAOR Supp. 12, at 11-14, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), cited in Petrowski,
Law and the Conduct of the Vietnam War, in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 439, 470-72 (R. Falk ed. 1969).
151 For the full text of the "Nuernberg Principles," see Petrowski, supra note 150,
at 470-72.
152 Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the Protection of War Victims,
Aug. 12, 1949, [19551 3 U.S.T. 3114-695, T.I.A.S. Nos. 3362-65, 75 U.N.T.S. 31-
417 [hereinafter cited as Geneva Conventions].
153 Id.
154 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [here-
inafter cited as Civilian Convention].
155 Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
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plicit in both is the idea that the supression of war crimes is of com-
mon benefit to all nations.156
The Conventions are applicable to "declared war or... any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one
of them,"'157 and "armed conflict not of an international character oc-
curring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties ..... 158
There is some dispute whether the Conventions are applicable under
either clause to the present conflict in Vietnam. The first clause
has been interpreted to imply that at least one of the parties must
recognize an existing state of war. None of the parties to the Viet-
nam conflict seems to have so recognized. And the presence of the
United States in Vietnam apparently destroys the noninternational
status necessary to fit the conflict within the second clause.' " The
intent of the Conventions, however, was obviously to deter crimes
against international concepts of lawful war in any case of armed
conflict, whether it be civil war, international war, or a combination
of the two. Thus, the better view is that the Conventions do apply
to situations like the present conflict in Vietnam.
Persons protected under the Conventions include those "who ...
in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict
... in the hands of a Party to the conflict... of which they are not
nationals."'160 In prohibiting certain acts, the Conventions speak
generally of "grave breaches" and define these to include the "will-
ful killing" of a person protected by the Conventions.' 6 '
Nationals of the contracting parties are legally obligated to ob-
serve all the provisions of the Conventions. 62 To effect this obliga-
tion, the Conventions seek to deter grave breaches in two ways: The
contracting parties are obligated (1) to educate their officials and
1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter cited as
POW Convention).
156 See Note, supra note 134, at 263.
157POW Convention art. 2; Civilian Convention art. 2.
158 POW Convention art. 3; Civilian Convention art. 3.
150 See Rubin, supra note 130, at 261-62.
160 Civilian Convention art. 4. Article 3 of the POW Convention protects "[pier-
sons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who
have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by ... detention, or any
other cause...."
161 Civilian Convention art. 147. Under the POW Convention, "grave breaches"
are dealt with in articles 129-31 and include "wilful killing, torture or inhuman treat-
ment .... "
162 See Note, supra note 134, at 247.
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personnel about the correct standards; 1' and (2) to punish those
individuals actually involved in the commission of grave breaches,
enacting any legislation necessary to provide for such punishment.'
The United States has not passed the legislation required to fulfill
the second obligation; instead, the responsibility for punishing
American war criminals is vested in military tribunals. 6" The Con-
ventions, however, obligate the United States to punish all offenders,
be they servicemen or ex-servicemen. Thus, whenever the UCMJ
fails to reach a grave breach because of the lack of jurisdiction over
ex-servicemen, the United States commits a breach of international
law.
CONCLUSION
The present status of the law concerning criminal jurisdiction
over ex-servciemen can be summarized by reviewing the rules which
apply in situations where jurisdiction may be in issue. Crimes com-
mitted in the United States present no jurisdictional problems. A
serviceman on active duty in the United States is subject to the con-
current jurisdiction of the domestic and military courts. And the
jurisdiction of the domestic courts survives the serviceman's dis-
charge.
A serviceman accused of a crime while on active duty outside the
United States can be tried by court-martial proceedings as long as
the charges are brought before his discharge. If a crime is com-
163 Civilian Convention art. 144 provides in part:
The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war,
to disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their
respective countries, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their
programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles
thereof may become known to the entire population.
The United States seems to be complying with this agreement. See 1964 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 89.
164 Civilian Convention art. 146 provides in part:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to
provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be
committed, any of the grave breaches of the Convention defined in . . . [ar-
ticle 147 and to] search for persons alleged to have committed ... such grave
breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its
own courts.
A similar proviso is contained in article 129 of the POW Convention, and pursuant to
article 129 some signatories have enacted the requisite legislation. See, e.g., Geneva
Conventions Act. 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. II, c. 52, S1 (Great Britain).
165 UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (FM
27-10) (1956), cited in Petrowski, supra note 150, at 461. This United States Army
Field Manual lists violations of the laws of war and grave breaches of the Geneva Con-
ventions and places them under the jurisdiction of courts-martial.
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mitted abroad and a suspected serviceman is not charged before his
release from active duty the following rules will apply: (1) the ex-
serviceman cannot be tried by court-martial, because of the Toth rule,
unless he voluntarily reenlists or volunteers for recall to active duty
and is recalled; (2) he cannot be tried by a domestic court because of
the present lack of extraterritorial criminal statutes; (3) -he can be
tried by a foreign tribunal if there is an extradition treaty in force
with the country where the crime was committed and if that treaty
provides for extradition of American nationals.
In the My Lai situation, the military and federal courts are fore-
closed, and there is no possibility for a foreign trial because of the
absence of an extradition treaty with South Vietnam. The United
States' failure to provide jurisdiction to try ex-servicemen accused of
crimes like those allegedly committed at My Lai constitutes the
breach of an obligation under the Geneva Conventions.
There is thus a need for legislation granting the federal courts
jurisdiction to try ex-servicemen accused of committing crimes abroad
who are released from active duty before charges are brought. In the
interests of international harmony and, in some cases, of complying
with its international agreements, the United States must insure that
these ex-servicemen are tried. The federal courts are the only prac-
tical forum available for these trials.
KENNETH A. HoOK
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